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ABSTRACT Introduction: Volleyball is a technical and team game where individual physical conditioning of the athletes has a fundamental role in the competition. The maintenance of this physical conditioning includes the optimization of physical function and the gain of body resistance. The ability to respond in front of a defensive game in the game of volleyball is one of the main keys to determining their defensive skills and overall defensive level. Objective: Investigate the reflexes of volleyball players during an athletic competition match. Methods: This was done by analyzing the avoidance rate and reaction time of 14 volunteers, volleyball players. The experimental method quantitatively measured the individuals' defense ability and reaction time. Finally, the statistical correlation test was used to obtain the correlation between the two results. Results: The practice time with games had a more significant impact on the performance of volleyball players. The players' cut-off point is limited to the lowest level. Their peaks have little effect on the defense rate of volleyball. Ball height shows that the index has a very good relationship with defensive ability. Conclusion: Reaction time in volleyball can be used to judge the level of player defense and select the most appropriate players for each moment of competition. Level of evidence II; Therapeutic studies - investigation of treatment outcomes.
RESUMO Introdução: O vôlei é um jogo técnico e de equipe onde condicionamento físico individual dos atletas tem um papel fundamental na competição. A manutenção desse condicionamento físico inclui a otimização da função física e o ganho da resistência corporal. A capacidade de resposta em frente a uma partida defensiva no jogo de vôlei é uma das principais chaves para determinar suas habilidades defensivas e o nível defensivo geral. Objetivo: Investigar os reflexos dos jogadores de vôlei durante uma partida de competição atlética. Métodos: Para isso, analisa-se a taxa de prevenção e o tempo de reação de 14 voluntários, jogadores de vôlei. Utilizou-se o método experimental para medir quantitativamente a capacidade de defesa dos indivíduos e o tempo de reação. Por fim, utilizou-se o teste de correlação estatística para obter a correlação entre os dois resultados. Resultados: O tempo de prática com jogos teve um impacto mais significativo no desempenho dos jogadores de vôlei. O ponto de corte dos jogadores é limitado ao nível mais baixo. Seus picos têm pouco efeito na taxa de defesa do vôlei. A altura da bola demonstra que o índice tem uma ótima relação com a capacidade defensiva. Conclusão: O tempo de reação no vôlei pode ser usado para julgar o nível de defesa dos jogadores e selecionar os profissionais mais adequados para cada momento da competição. Nível de evidência II; Estudos terapêuticos - investigação dos resultados do tratamento.
RESUMEN Introducción: El voleibol es un juego técnico y de equipo en el que el acondicionamiento físico individual de los deportistas tiene un papel fundamental en la competición. El mantenimiento de este acondicionamiento físico incluye la optimización de la función física y la ganancia de la resistencia corporal. La capacidad de respuesta ante un juego defensivo en el juego del voleibol es una de las principales claves para determinar sus habilidades defensivas y su nivel defensivo general. Objetivo: Investigar los reflejos de los jugadores de voleibol durante un partido de competición. Métodos: Para ello, se analiza la tasa de evasión y el tiempo de reacción de 14 voluntarios, jugadores de voleibol. Se utilizó el método experimental para medir cuantitativamente la capacidad de defensa y el tiempo de reacción de los individuos. Por último, se utilizó la prueba de correlación estadística para obtener la correlación entre los dos resultados. Resultados: El tiempo de práctica con juegos tuvo un impacto más significativo en el rendimiento de los jugadores de voleibol. El punto de corte de los jugadores se limita al nivel más bajo. Sus picos tienen poco efecto en el ritmo de la defensa del voleibol. La altura del balón muestra que el índice tiene una muy buena relación con la capacidad defensiva. Conclusión: El tiempo de reacción en el voleibol puede utilizarse para juzgar el nivel de defensa de los jugadores y seleccionar a los profesionales más adecuados para cada momento de la competición. Nivel de evidencia II; Estudios terapéuticos - investigación de los resultados del tratamiento.
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As the major means of outpatient payment for basic medical insurance (the insurance for short) relies on fee-for-service, it tends to encourage unreasonable growth of medical expenses. Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper analyzed the principal-agent relationship between the insurance handling agencies and the hospitals designated by the insurance, and constructed a benefit game model of outpatient payment methods and the supporting supervision game model. This practice aims to explore the optimal and balanced benefit of the insurance payment methods and supporting supervision mechanism, and provide decision support for promoting the reform of medical insurance outpatient payment in China. The analysis results of the benefit game model of payment methods showed that a system mixing the post-payment and pre-payment could optimize and maximize the total benefits and interests of all the stakeholders within the system. Specifically, the practice recommended was a mixed payment integrating ambulatory-payment-classification, fee-for-service and global-budget-payment. The analysis of the supporting regulatory game model found that the factors that must be considered to ensure the expected utility of the above mixed payment mode as follows: the gap between the unreasonable income obtained by the hospital by out-of-control charging and the reward obtained by under-control charging, the size of the penalty after the unreasonable income of the hospital was discovered, the size of the regulatory cost and the loss of benefits of the government and the insured group. It is suggested to adopt the mixed payment method mainly based on the ambulatory-payment-classification supported by fee-for-service and global-budget. At the same time, medical insurance agencies can improve their supervision mechanism from such aspects as perfecting penalties, reducing supervision costs, leveraging government administrative power and advocating public supervision.
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O objetivo deste estudo foi analisar os desafios e possibilidades que emergiram na implementação de um programa de futsal para adultos com deficiência intelectual (DI). Pautado em uma representação de jogo (árvore de decisão) e nas perspectivas táticas de ensino, o programa foi permeado de obstáculos e desafios acerca das estratégias utilizadas para favorecer a compreensão de conceitos, heurísticas e ações de jogo (presentes na árvore de decisão e trabalhados a partir de jogos reduzidos e do jogo formal), exigindo adequações metodológicas no decorrer do programa, que vieram a contribuir com o desenvolvimento dos alunos no contexto do jogo (AU).
The aim of this study was to analyze the challenges and possibilities that emerged in the implementation of a futsal program for adults with intellectual disabilities (ID). Based on a game representation (decision tree) and teaching tactical perspectives, the program was permeated with obstacles and challenges related to the teaching strategies used to contribute to the understanding of the concepts, heuristics and actions of the game (present in the decision tree and worked on from reduced games and formal games) requiring methodological adjustments throughout the program, which came to contribute to the development of students in the context of the game (AU).
El objetivo de este estudio fue analizar los desafíos y posibilidades que surgieron en la implementación de un programa de fútbol sala para adultos con discapacidad intelectual (DI). Basado en una representación del juego (árbol de decisiones) y la enseñanza de perspectivas tácticas, el programa estuvo impregnado de obstáculos y desafíos en cuanto a las estrategias utilizadas para favorecer la comprensión de conceptos, heurísticas y acciones del juego (presentes en el árbol de decisiones y trabajadas desde juegos reducidos y juegos formales) requiriendo ajustes metodológicos a lo largo del programa, que llegaron a contribuir al desarrollo de los estudiantes en el contexto del juego (AU).
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Humans , Play and Playthings , Teaching , Adaptation, Psychological , Health Strategies , Persons with Mental Disabilities , Intellectual DisabilityABSTRACT
OBJECTIVE：To provide reference for the stable operation of TCM industrial technology innovation strategic alliance（called“TCM industrial alliance ”for short ）as well as the transformation and upgrading of TCM industry. METHODS ： The game theory was adopted to construct the initial game model and repeated game model of cooperative trust among the members of TCM industrial alliance under moral self-discipline ，and mixed strategy game model under external constraints. The main influential factors of trust mechanism construction for TCM industrial alliance were analyzed ，and countermeasures and suggestions were put forward for the trust mechanism construction of TCM industrial alliance in China. RESULTS & CONCLUTIONS ：Both the initial game model and the finite repeated game model showed that the strategy combination of （distrust，distrust）was the only Nash equilibrium. At this time ，the overall benefit of the alliance was the smallest ，and the innovation efficiency and stability of the alliance were very low. The infinite repeated game model showed that the strategy combination of （trust，trust）was the equilibrium path of the repeated game. The long-term benefits of both sides of the game due to trustworthiness were greater than those obtained by dishonesty. At this time ，the total benefits of the alliance were the largest ，but both sides of the game needed to have sufficient patience and enough game times. The mixed strategy game model showed that when the loss of breach of trust was large enough and there was no upper limit ，the alliance members chose to trust each other ，and the strategy of （trust，trust）was the only Nash equilibrium；when the loss of breach of trust was relatively small and closer to the upper limit ，the more reluctant the alliance members were to choose to keep faith ，and the external constraint force was weak. The number of games ，the completeness of game information and the strength of external constraints were the key factors to establish alliance trust mechanism. It is suggested that an efficient communication system ，transparent information disclosure system and perfect reward and punishment system should be established within TCM industrial alliance ，and the role of government and non-governmental third parties should be fully played to promote the stable operation of TCM industrial alliance in China.
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OBJECTIVE：To provide reference for improving the mechanism of drug supervision in Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. METHODS ：Based on the evolutionary game theory ，the stakeholders of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area in the stage of drug safety supervision were identified ；the evolutionary game model was established so as to obtain the behavioral selection and evolutionary stability strategy of the each party through and put forward the suggestions for improving the mechanism of drug supervision in Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. RESULTS & CONCLUSIONS：Based on evolutionary game theory ，the three-party evolutionary game model of drug administration ，drug inspection and manufacturing enterprises was established. According to the model established in this study ，it could be concluded that：when the compliance cost of the production enterprise was less than the sum of the violation cost and the bribery cost minus the additional income ，or less than the sum of violation cost and punishment and reputation lossminus the additional income ，the manufacturing enterprises could achieve the equilibrium state of compliance production ；the supervision probability was inversely proportional to the supervision cost ，and strict inspection was inversely proportional to inspection cost ；compliance productivity rate and strict detection rate were in direct proportion to the intensity of supervision and penalties ；the higher the supervision probability was，the higher the strict detection rate was ，and the compliance productivity would gradually increase. It is proposed to link enterprise information files ，lay the foundation of four party cogovernance ；introduce the “cost-benefit”supervision system ，make reasonable use of the third-party inspection institutions ；clarify the boundary of personnel responsibility ，and use the intelligent system for real-time supervision so as to promote the improvement of drug safety supervision in Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Ba y Area.
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Resumo Parte-se do pressuposto de que o filósofo americano Bernard Suits é central para a filosofia do esporte, especialmente na literatura internacional. Sua extensa obra oferece uma teoria do Jogo original e ainda não explorada na Educação Física brasileira. Suits distingue o fenômeno Jogo (game) da experiência do jogar (play), além de propor uma definição analítica de Jogo que é aqui apresentada aos modos de um prelúdio de sua teoria. Discute-se que, do ponto de vista de uma filosofia analítica, avança-se na metafísica do Jogo, ou em uma efetiva filosofia do Jogo, quando mobilizamos a definição de Suits de jogar um Jogo (game-playing). Reconhecem-se ainda subsídios analíticos distintos da definição intencionalmente vaga de famílias de jogos da herança wittgensteiniana, influente nas concepções brasileiras. Acredita-se que tais recursos fornecem renovado material para os estudos do Jogo na filosofia do esporte e Educação Física brasileiras, nos domínios da metafísica, lógica, epistemologia e axiologia.
Abstract It is assumed that the American philosopher Bernard Suits is central to the philosophy of sport, especially in the international literature. His extensive work offers an original and unexplored theory of game in Brazilian Physical Education. Suits distinguishes the phenomenon of game from the experience of playing, in addition to proposing an analytical definition of game that is presented in the ways of a prelude to his theory. It is argued that, from the point of view of an analytical philosophy, one advances into the metaphysics of games, or an effective philosophy of the game, when Suits's definition of game-playing is mobilized. One also recognizes different analytical subsidies from the intentionally vague definition of game families of Wittgensteinian heritage, influential in Brazilian conceptions. It is believed that such resources provide new material for game studies in Brazilian sport philosophy and Physical Education, in the domains of metaphysics, logic, epistemology and axiology.
Resumen Se parte del supuesto de que el filósofo estadounidense Bernard Suits es fundamental para la filosofía del deporte, especialmente en la literatura internacional. Su extensa obra ofrece una teoría de juegos original y aún inexplorada en la Educación Física brasileña. Suits distingue el fenómeno juego (game) de la experiencia de jugar (play), además de proponer una definición analítica de juego, presentada aquí como un preludio a su teoría. Se discute que, desde el punto de vista de una filosofía analítica, se avanza en la metafísica del juego, o en una efectiva filosofía del juego, cuando movilizamos la definición de Suits de jugar un juego (game-playing). Se reconocen, además, subsidios analíticos distintos a la definición intencionalmente vaga de familias de juegos de la herencia wittgensteiniana, que tiene influencia en las concepciones brasileñas. Se cree que tales recursos brindan renovado material para los estudios del juego en la filosofía del deporte y en la Educación Física brasileñas, en los dominios de la metafísica, la lógica, la epistemología y la axiología.
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Philosophy , Sports , Game Theory , MetaphysicsABSTRACT
Luohu District of Shenzhen has implemented the global budget management mode as " surplus reward, no compensation for overspending and reasonable sharing" in the hospital group, which continued to strengthen cooperation, optimize services, reduce costs, and improve health outcomes. The authors employed the game theory to build a game model of medical alliance under Luohu global budget management mode, discussing the reasons of medical and health institution′s stronger cooperation and what could be improved in Luohu′s case. Based on the experience of Luohu total budget management, it is suggested that when implementing total budget, all localities should improve closed-loop management, expand coverage, adopt compound medical insurance payment method, promote outpatient coordination, strengthen assessment and incentives, so as to give full play to the incentive role of total budget.
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Resumen En los espacios públicos, los ciudadanos enfrentan decisiones que involucran comportamientos egoístas o de cooperación social que afectan la calidad de la vida urbana. ¿Qué hace que la decisión del ciudadano beneficie al grupo social y no solo al individuo? Este artículo explora los dilemas que enfrentan las personas en el entorno urbano a partir del modelo experimental de la teoría de juegos. Participaron 80 personas que, en parejas, tuvieron que decidir entre un comportamiento urbano responsable (CUR) y uno incívico, en condiciones que dieron lugar a la distribución aleatoria de los participantes en cuatro grupos equivalentes conformados por 20 parejas cada uno (en promedio). Cada individuo tenía que elegir actuar de manera cooperativa o egoísta, dependiendo de la decisión de su pareja de obtener el máximo beneficio. Los grupos diferían de acuerdo con la cantidad de beneficios asociados a la reciprocidad (altos, medios o nada, es decir, altruismo, y a su valor abstracto o concreto). Los resultados mostraron que la decisión de optar por un CUR depende, en mayor medida, de la magnitud del beneficio y la probabilidad de obtener reciprocidad, y, en menor medida, del altruismo o del tipo de CUR involucrado en la situación. Se discuten los resultados en función de las implicaciones para la cooperación ciudadana.
Abstract In public spaces, citizens face decisions that involve selfish or social cooperation behaviors, that affects the quality of urban life. What makes that their decision benefit the social group instead their individual benefit only? This article explores the dilemmas that individuals meet in the urban environment from the experimental model of game theory. Participated 80 people who had to decide, in pairs, between a responsible urban behavior (CUR, Spanish acronym) versus an uncivic behavior. Participants were distributed by random into four groups, consisting of 20 couples each one (on average). Each individual had to choose to act cooperatively or selfishly depending on their partner's decision to get the maximum benefit from the situation. Groups differed according the amount of benefits associated to reciprocity, high medium or nothing (altruism) and its concrete or abstract value. The results showed that the decision to opt for a CUR depends mostly on the magnitude of the benefit and the probability of receiving reciprocity, and to a lesser extent on altruism or the type of CUR involved in the situation. Findings are discussed based on their implications for citizen cooperation.
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Humans , Male , Female , Social Behavior , Play and Playthings , Behavior , Affect , Self-ControlABSTRACT
O sistema de economia de fichas (SEF) foi usado em um jogo para avaliar seu efeito sobre a cooperação. Crianças de uma escola pública receberam fichas e optaram entre guardá-las ou doá-las anonimamente em uma urna; o número de fichas era triplicado e distribuído igualmente às crianças, que escolhiam, então, entre "comprar" itens ou economizar. O SEF teve efeito na cooperação: 60% das crianças adotaram mais a estratégia cooperativa do que a egoísta, ainda que os perfis individuais mostrem uma aparente exploração de estratégias diversas. O SEF mostrou-se uma alternativa viável e aponta caminhos para aplicação em contextos escolares.
The token economy system was used in a cooperative game to evaluate its effect on cooperation. Public school's children received tokens and chose to keep or donate them anonymously in an urn. The contents of the collective urn were tripled and distributed equally at the end of the session. Children could choose to "buy" items or save tokens. This system affected cooperative behavior: 60% of participants have adopted a more cooperative strategy than the free-rider, even though individual profiles show an apparent exploration of different strategies. These results indicate ways for application in scholar contexts.
El sistema de economía de fichas se utilizó como juego cooperativo para investigar la cooperación entre los niños. Los niños de una escuela pública recibieron fichas y optaron por guardarlas o donarlas de forma anónima en una urna. El contenido de la urna se triplicó y se distribuyó igualmente. Con la ficha que tenían, podían "comprar" artículos o ahorrar las fichas. La aplicación de este sistema parece haber afectado el comportamiento cooperativo, manteniéndolo prevalente entre los participantes (60% de los participantes), mismo que individualmente parecen haber explorado diferentes estrategias. Estos resultados indican formas de aplicación en contextos escolares.
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Clinical decision-making is a series of activities of medical scheme selection, which determines the direction of medical behavior and the level of patients' welfare. In practice, clinical decision-making is not only restricted by medical technology factors, but also by non-technical factors. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze and predict the possible influence of non-technical factors in clinical decision-making. Game theory is a scientific system of strategic choice, which can effectively predict and analyze the impact of non-technical factors on clinical decision-making process. According to the game analysis results between doctors and patients, medical management and pharmaceutical enterprises, we can predict the non-technical impacts in clinical decision-making and their influence paths, guide clinical decision-makers to choose excellent strategies, abide by rationality and give up moderately, so as to improve the level of clinical decision-making and the welfare of patients.
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RESUMEN Este artículo se estructura sobre dos conceptos: la planificación (como intento de predicción del futuro a través de la razón) y el juego (en tanto libertad en el presente), desde los cuales se discuten los procesos de trabajo, las formas organizativas, la institucionalidad y la gestión de las instituciones públicas del campo social, con énfasis en las del campo de la salud y la educación. A partir del planteo de Nietzsche sobre las figuras mitológicas griegas Dionisio y Apolo, se realiza una síntesis del desarrollo de la planificación en América Latina a través de Carlos Matus y Mario Testa para, desde allí, analizar el juego a lo largo de la historia, la propuesta del Homo ludens y la presencia no reconocida del juego en el cotidiano de las instituciones sociales. Entender el juego no garantiza que se cambien las formas en que se lo juega. Allí reside la complejidad y el desafío que debe ser pensado en la relación de estructuras que son estructurantes pero que, a su vez, son estructuradas por la acción de sus agentes, en el marco de procesos de reproducción y dominación social que naturalizan las formas institucionales vigentes.
ABSTRACT This article is structured around two concepts - planning (as the attempt to predict the future through reason) and play (as freedom in the present) - used to discuss work processes, organizational forms, institutionality and the management of public institutions in the social field, with an emphasis on the fields of health and education. Based on Nietzche's reflection regarding the mythological figures of Dionysus and Apollo, a synthesis of the development of planning in Latin America is carried out with the aid of works by Carlos Matus and Mario Testa. From this perspective, play is analyzed over the course of history, in addition to the proposal of Homo ludens and the unrecognized role of play in the day life of social institutions. However, understanding the game does not guarantee that the forms of playing it will change. Therein lie the complexity and challenges that must be considered in relation to structures that are both structuring and structured by the actions of their agents, in the framework of processes of reproduction and social domination that naturalize current institutional forms.
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Humans , Play and Playthings , Delivery of Health Care , Game Theory , Health Planning , Social Environment , Cultural Characteristics , Forecasting , Latin AmericaABSTRACT
Resumo A adoção de mecanismos de escolha escolar é pouco estudada no Brasil, apesar do seu crescente uso em outros países, sobretudo, nos EUA. Neste artigo, com o uso de instrumental teoria dos jogos, o sistema de matrículas escolares do município de São Paulo é analisado. Por não usar as preferências dos alunos, verifica-se que o sistema não atende a nenhum dos conceitos desejados de um mecanismo de alocação: estabilidade, não manipulação e eficiência. Alternativamente, é proposta adoção do mecanismo de Gale-Shapley. Simulações são realizadas para corroborar os resultados teóricos, indicando enorme potencial de ganhos com a mudança do sistema existente.
Resumen La adopción de mecanismos de elección escolar es poco estudiada en Brasil. En este artículo, con el uso de la teoría de los juegos, el sistema de matrices escolares del municipio de São Paulo es analizado. Por no usar las preferencias de los alumnos, verificase que el sistema de São Paulo no atiende las principales cualidades de un mecanismo de asignación: estabilidad, no manipulación y eficiencia. Alternativamente, se propone utilizar el mecanismo de Gale-Shapley. Simulaciones son realizadas para corroborar los resultados históricos, exigiendo enormes potencialidades de ganancias con el cambio del sistema existente.
Abstract School choice is an issue little studied in Brazil, despite its huge importance, especially in the USA. In this paper, using game theory, how students are allocated in municipality of São Paulo is analyzed. As students 'preferences are not taken into account, the São Paulo system does not meet the main qualities of an allocation mechanism: stability, non-manipulation and efficiency. Alternatively, the use of the Gale-Shapley mechanism is proposed. Simulations are performed confirming theoretical results and also indicating a huge potential for improvement in the system.
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Education , Game Theory , GovernmentABSTRACT
At present,because market price survey and health insurance payment standard adjustment mechanism in china is incomplete,health insurance payment standard can not be completely equivalent to the actual market price of drugs. This paper analyzed and summarized the main factors affecting the balance and formation mechanisms under differ-ent medical insurance payment standard policies. It is found that the balance formation mechanism depends not only on the reimbursement ratio of drugs,but also on the development pattern of the payment standard and on the source of the refer-ence price system selected. On the issue of the ownership of the balance,from the specific practices of pilot cities such as Chongqing and Shaoxing,it can be seen that the merits and demerits still exist to the medical institutions for internal de-velopment models or re-allocated by the government agencies'performance-based. Compared with the simple balance reten-tion model,the redistribution model can enhance the service of medical institutions by regulating their behavior. However, medical institutions may provide false data to get more balance in the redistribution model,and game theory was used to reduce the policy risk of misreporting the private balance of data from medical institutions,and the analysis of strategic choices of medical institutions and supervisory departments Finally,"three-step"policy proposal was proposed on the issue of balance attribution. In the short term,the balance should be given to the medical institutions to increase their bargaining motivation. At the same time,the performance appraisal and supervision methods should be explored to enhance the feasi-bility of redistribution model. In the long run,the balance should be eliminated gradually through the improvement of mar-ket price survey and medical insurance payment standard adjustment mechanism.
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Objective:To study the effect of hierarchical diagnosis on optimizing medical resource allocation based on big data era.Methods:Literature analysis and game theory analysis.Results:It established hierarchical diagnosis model based on game theory,analyzed the effect of hierarchical diagnosis after introducing big data,established the hierarchical diagnosis structure diagram based on big data.Conclusion:Under the big data background,hierarchical diagnosis could give full play to the value of data,optimize the allocation of medical resources,accurate diagnosis of patients,and make a positive effect on medical institutions and patients.
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En administración, se pueden presentar dos tipos de problemas de toma de decisiones: los que se solucionan en condiciones de certeza, es decir, libre de riesgo al optar por una solución, y los que dependen de la probabilidad de ocurrencia de eventos para poder tomar una decisión. En este último caso, aparecen con gran regularidad problemas de toma de decisiones en condiciones de conflicto, conocidos como teoría de juegos; como por ejemplo la adquisición de recursos informáticos, en el que la decisión de invertir en un recurso y no en otro adquiere mayor relevancia, en función de sus altos precios, y su gran demanda en cualquier rama de la sociedad. En la Facultad de Tecnología de la Universidad de Ciencias Médicas de Santiago de Cuba, se modeló el proceso de compras de estos recursos, a través de esta teoría, al no contar con opciones científicamente probadas hasta ese momento, que reportasen el mayor beneficio a la hora de adquirirlos cualquiera sea la plataforma informática. Por ello el objetivo de este trabajo es determinar desde el enfoque de la programación lineal, y específicamente la Teoría de Juegos, la estrategia óptima que bajo ciertas condiciones permitan conducir el proceso de adquisición de recursos informáticos. Como resultado se obtuvo una solución óptima, en la que se recomendaba invertir solamente en hardware para estaciones de trabajo, así como en hardware y componentes de red; lo que garantizaría la mejor forma de adaptación de los recursos invertidos, sin importar cuál sea la plataforma informática(AU)
In administration, two types of decision-making problems can be presented: those that are solved in conditions of certainty, that is, free of risk when opting for a solution, and those that depend on the probability of occurrence of events to be able to make a decision. In the last case, problems of decision-making in conditions of conflict, known as game theory, appear with great regularity; such as the purchase of computing resources, in which the decision to invest in one resource and not in another acquires greater relevance, due to its high prices and its high demand in any branch of society. In the Faculty of Technology of the University of Medical Sciences of Santiago de Cuba, the process of purchasing these resources was modeled through this theory, as it did not count with scientifically proved options until that moment, which reported the greatest benefit when purchasing them whatever the computing platform. Therefore, the objective of this work was to determine from the linear programming approach, and specifically the Games Theory, the optimal strategy that, under certain conditions, allows conducting the process of acquisition of computing resources. As a result, an optimal solution was obtained, which recommended investing only in hardware for workstations, and in hardware and network components; which would guarantee the best form of adaptation of the resources invested, no matter what the computing platform(AU)
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Humans , Programming, Linear , Mathematical Computing , Programming Languages , Game TheoryABSTRACT
Os fatores subjacentes ao favorecimento do endogrupo e de indiferença/hostilidade ao exogrupo são amplamente estudados pela psicologia social, onde estudos reportam que, por exemplo, indivíduos confiam mais e associam palavras positivas aos membros do mesmo grupo. O estudo desses fatores pode ajudar na compreensão de fenômenos tais como preconceito e etnocentrismo. As perspectivas evolucionista e neuroendócrina vêm sendo extremamente relevantes nos últimos anos para o estudo do favoritismo ingroup. Todavia, uma busca sistemática nas bases de dados Lilacs, Scielo, Google Scholar e Web of Science por palavras-chave relacionadas ao viés de grupo demonstrou uma carência por publicações nesse tema no Brasil. Dos trabalhos recuperados, apenas um se enquadrava na perspectiva evolucionista e nenhum abordava os mecanismos neuroendócrinos do viés de grupo. Dessa forma, o objetivo do presente estudo é discutir o viés de grupo através de uma perspectiva biológica, explicitando as hipóteses para a evolução desses comportamentos, os métodos empregados para o estudo dos mesmos e as bases neuroendócrinas e os substratos neurais que os medeiam.
Los factores subyacentes al favorecimiento del endogrupo y a la indiferencia/hostilidad al exogrupo son ampliamente estudiados por la psicología social, donde estudios informan, por ejemplo, que los indivíduos confian más y asocian palabras positivas a los miembros del mismo grupo. El estúdio de esos factores puede ayudar en la comprensíon de fenómenos tales como el prejuicio y el etnocentrismo. Las perspectivas evolucionista y neuroendócrina han sido extremadamente relevantes en los últimos años para el estúdio del favoritismo ingroup. Sin embargo, una búsqueda sistemática en las bases de datos Lilacs, Scielo, Web of Science y Google Scholar por palabras claves relacionadas al sesgo de grupo demostró una carencia de publicaciones sobre ese tema en Brasil. De los trabajos recuperados sólo uno se ajustaba a la perspectiva evolucionista y ninguno abordaba los mecanismos neuroendocrino del sesgo de grupo. De esta manera, el objetivo del presente estudio es discutir el sesgo de grupo a través de una perspectiva biológica, explicando las hipótesis para la evolución de esos comportamientos, los métodos utilizados para el estúdio de ellos, las bases neuroendocrinas y los sustratos neurales que los median.
The factors underlying to the ingroup favoritism and outgroup indifference/hostility are broadly studied by social psychology, where studies report that, for example, individuals trust more and associate positive words to members of the same group. The study of these factors can help in understand phenomena such as prejudice and ethonocentrism. However, a systematic search in the databases Web of Science, Google Scholar, Scielo, and Lilacs for the keywords related to group bias showed a studies shortage for this topic in Brazil. Besides, in the studies retrieved, just one fitted into evolutionary perspective and no study has approached the neuroendocrine mechanisms of the group bias. Therefore, the objective of this study was to discuss the group bias through the biological perspective, explaining the evolutionary hypothesis to the evolution of these behaviors, the methods applied to study this topic, and the neuroendocrine basis and neural substrates mediating them.
Subject(s)
Humans , Psychoanalysis , Psychology, Social , Neuroendocrinology , Game TheoryABSTRACT
Objective To understand the interests of the government,large general hospitals,higher medical institutions and primary health care institutions to promote the establishment of hierarchical diagnosis and treatment system.Methods The game theory is used to analyze the contradictions and interests of the stakeholders.Results The lack of government investment,the higher medical institutions not wanting to sink medical resources,lack of capacity for primary health care institutions and other issues hinder the smooth implementation of the classification system.Conclusion The role of government should be played,and government investment be increased;the division of labor among medical institutions be strengthened,and medical resources be reasonably allocated;and the strength of primary health care institutions be improved.
ABSTRACT
The pharmaceutical circulation policy reform is the key link of the three medical linkage reform with a view of deepening medical reform.The policy formulation and implementation will inevitably lead to interest redistribution.Therefore, it is an effective means to comprehensively understand the unexpected results of the reform and the scientific decision-making of the policy direction, while ensuring the smooth progress of the reform.Based on the research literature presented on pharmaceutical circulation reform and policies since the new medical reform, this paper revealed the prevailing problems and limitations of the existing researches, demonstrated that policy evaluation based on the scientific theory framework is a powerful tool to judge whether the reform goals are achieved.With the introduction of the stakeholder theory and the game theory in pharmaceutical circulation policy evaluation, the complex influence factors can be quantified under scientific theoretical framework, so that the causal mechanism of the policy effect can be learnt, which can help to have a clearer interpretation of the pharmaceutical circulation reform policy, and to provide a scientific and reasonable reference for future policy direction.
ABSTRACT
Doctor-patient relationship is essentially a kind of trust relationship.From the perspective of economics,the trust between people is based on the cooperative behavior with the intersection of interest.Although the stag hunt game shows that the attitudes of bounded rational individuals on cooperationissues tend to be cautious and suspicious,the practice attribute of doctor-patient interaction enables the two sides to generate socialized cooperation emotion.In reality,the doctor's too much consideration on personal interests,the patients' previous negative medical experience,the particularity of medical market and other issues will hinder the cooperation of doctor-patient and it needs to be solvedtargeted.
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzed medical dispute litigation from the view of game theory.The adoption of mediation strategy for both hospital and patient was the Pareto optimal of this model.The adoption of court decision for both hospital and patient was the Nash equilibrium and its overall benefit was the Pareto suboptimal of this model.The communication of patient's lawyer can prompt the reconciliation between hospital and patient.On the one hand,it let the hospital realize the responsibilities they should bear,on the other hand let patients be willing to make concessions on the basis of the original claims,and finally made the two sides reach a reconciliation agreement,thus to make conflict between hospital and patient end in litigation and the overall benefits maximize.